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'Lack of oversight' among causes for fatal collision of WW2-era aircraft at Dallas air show

Debris from two planes that crashed during an airshow at Dallas Executive Airport lie on the ground Saturday, Nov. 12, 2022. (AP Photo/LM Otero)
LM Otero/AP
/
AP
Debris from two planes that crashed during an airshow at Dallas Executive Airport lie on the ground Saturday, Nov. 12, 2022. (AP Photo/LM Otero)

Lack of oversight and administrative risk controls were among the causes for the 2022 mid-air collision between two World War II-era military aircraft at a Dallas air show. That's according to a press release by the National Transportation Safety Board on Monday.

The NTSB, which investigated aircraft crashes, also pointed to "inadequate prebriefing" prior to the Commemorative Air Force's Wings Over Dallas air show on Nov. 12, 2022. . During the show, a Boing B-17G "Flying Fortress" bomber and a Bell P63F "Kingcobra" collided in mid-air.

Five occupants of the B17 died, as well as the pilot of the single-seat P-63.

A synopsis of the NTSB's investigation into the accident found that the pilots of the two aircraft "had limited ability to see and avoid each other’s airplane due to flight path geometry, out-the-window view obscuration by aircraft structures, the attention demands associated with the air show performance, and the limitations of human performance that can make it difficult to see another aircraft."

An "air boss" at the show was responsible for supervising the aircraft involved. The NTSB synopsis said he relied on "real-time, predictive assessment of airplane locations and the ability of the CAF pilots to see and avoid other airplanes." But the NTSB said that was ineffective because "the flight paths of the Boeing B-17G and the Bell P-63F converged as each pilot maneuvered to set up for the pass."

The synopsis noted that air bosses "are not subject to any recurrent evaluations, and there are no standardized communications terms for air boss-provided directives to ensure the clarity and brevity of radio communications."

It further stated that "the lack of guidance and required surveillance tasks for FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) inspectors assigned to air shows related to the direct observation of an air boss’s performance represents a missed opportunity for inspectors to detect and provide debriefing feedback to address performance-related safety issues."

The NTSB said there was evidence that the FAA and the International Council of Air Shows Inc. (ICAS) "did not adequately address the need to better mitigate the collision risks associated with air boss-directed performances involving multiple, dissimilar aircraft."

And the Commemorative Air Force's "lack of a strong, clearly defined safety risk assessment plan resulted in air show production decisions that were not systematically developed to determine acceptable levels of risk and were susceptible to influences unrelated to safety," according to the NTSB. The Commemorative Air Force is a nonprofit organization that preserves World Air II-era aircraft that can still fly, and shows them at air shows.

The NTSB synopsis stated that the probable cause of the accident "was the air boss’s and air show event organizer’s lack of an adequate, prebriefed aircraft separation plan for the air show performance, relying instead on the air boss’s real-time deconfliction directives and the see-and-avoid strategy for collision avoidance, which allowed for the loss of separation between the Boeing B-17G and the Bell P-63F airplanes.

It noted "diminished ability of the accident pilots to see and avoid the other aircraft due to flight path geometry, out-the-window view obscuration by aircraft structures, attention demands associated with the air show performance, and the inherent limitations of human performance that can make it difficult to see another aircraft."

And it pointed to to a "lack of FAA guidance for air bosses and air show event organizers on developing plans and performing risk assessments that ensure the separation of aircraft that are not part of an approved maneuvers package and the lack of FAA requirements and guidance for recurrent evaluations of air bosses and direct surveillance of their performance."

A final report on the accident is scheduled to be released on Thursday.

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