TERRY GROSS, HOST:
This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. Have you ever been targeted by a cyber scam, maybe through an email or text message that sounds convincing and tries to get you to send money or your bank information? There are so many cyber scams out there now. As you'll hear, our show has been fraudulently represented in one of those. AI is making these scams easier to pull off, making fraudulent schemes even more lucrative.
The romance scam is the most lucrative. That's when someone reaches out to you, via text or online, who you've never met in person, and eventually you fall in love. The object of that affection professes to love you and eventually lures you into what they say is a great investment opportunity. You send the money, and then more money. Soon all your money's gone, and you never hear from that person again.
Some major crime organizations behind scams like this are based in Laos and Cambodia. My guest, Andy Greenberg, wrote about one such organization for Wired magazine, where he's a senior writer. That story involves human trafficking. Greenberg was contacted by a young computer engineer using the pseudonym Red Bull who was tricked into moving from India to Laos with the promise of a good IT job. When he got to the compound where his job was supposed to be, his passport was confiscated. He was turned into an indentured servant and forced to engage victims in cyber romance scams. Living conditions were awful. So was the work.
Red Bull managed to leak over three months of internal videos from inside the crime operation, including WhatsApp group chats, revealing details of how this operation actually functioned. This investigation will be included in Greenberg's forthcoming book, "The Grayscale: True Stories Of Hackers, Outlaws And Vigilantes From The Online Underground." He's also the author of books about the crime lords of cryptocurrency and about Russian hackers.
Andy Greenberg, welcome back to FRESH AIR.
ANDY GREENBERG: Very glad to be here. Thank you, Terry.
GROSS: So I want to start with a scam that has fraudulently used FRESH AIR, and you've been targeted by a similar scam. We've heard from authors who have gotten invitations allegedly from our show, in my name, in our co-host Tonya's name or someone else on the show - one of our producers - saying, you know, we love your work, and that, therefore, the writer is invited to be a guest on FRESH AIR.
And the reason why the authors contacted us is that something seemed suspicious about the email. And in fact, if the writer contacted the person who sent the email, they would be told, you have to pay - and it's typically about $250 or $350 - in order to defray the costs of the interview and help support the show. So they're trying to get money from authors.
So this is horrible because some people actually pay and are defrauded of money. Other people are just let down because they think they're going to be on a national show, and they're not. And also, it sullies our name. We would never dream of asking a guest to pay to be on our show. Other NPR shows, other podcasts have been also fraudulently represented in this scam. And tell what your similar scam is.
GREENBERG: Yes. I've gotten these emails. I'm an author. So I've gotten emails from, you know, fake agents, from fake publishers. Just yesterday, I got an email from someone describing themselves as an editor at Penguin Random House, praising my last book and wanting to work with me on another project. I don't think that this scammer realized that my last book was published with Penguin Random House, so it was kind of a giveaway. But it was very flattering.
And, you know, I'm sure if I had pursued that conversation, it would have led eventually to them demanding a payment before we could go any further, just as the scammers impersonating FRESH AIR are asking for these fake so-called production fees. And, yes, this is incredibly common, to the degree that I think, like, most authors I know have faced something like it.
GROSS: So I know you haven't written about this. You haven't done an investigation into it. Are there any insights that you have into how this works or who's behind it?
GREENBERG: Well, first, I think to talk about why this is happening, it just seems very clear, just almost intuitively, that this is because of AI - because of large language models, AI chatbots. Just as a kind of experiment, a very basic experiment, I just asked ChatGPT to generate an email from Terry Gross to me, Andy Greenberg, inviting me on to the show. And then, you know, as a...
GROSS: Aww.
GREENBERG: ...Kind of afterthought...
GROSS: That's great.
GREENBERG: ...You know...
GROSS: Yeah.
GREENBERG: ...Asking for a production fee of $250. And it happily did that without hesitation. As a follow-up, I said, you know, Greenberg is now resisting paying. Can you persuade him? And it happily, you know, created a follow up email, sort of arguing that I needed to pay. And this is just so easy, and it's not even the most advanced kind of scam that AI is capable of today.
But to answer your question, too, of who is behind this, you know, I don't know exactly who is impersonating FRESH AIR, of course. But I did, ahead of this interview, reach out to one of my favorite cybercrime researchers, Gary Warner, one of the founders of a security company called DarkTower. And he actually has, on behalf of authors, investigated this and found that those phone numbers had, you know, the +234 country code prefix. That's Nigeria's country code. He even, in some cases, identified the scammers by name, and they were Nigerian nationals.
So it seems likely that this is kind of the latest flavor of email scam being sent by a kind of older and pretty well-known cabal of, you know, cybercriminal organizations sometimes known as the Yahoo Boys, based in Nigeria and who have been sending - I mean, we've all heard of the Nigerian prince. You know?
GROSS: Exactly.
GREENBERG: They've been sending these email scams for many years - for decades, in fact - but this is somehow the latest version of it. And it is absolutely being supercharged by AI - the ability to literally instantly create a personalized and polished, perfect-English, zero-grammatical-errors email to an author that flatters them specifically, and to do this for hundreds or thousands of targets simultaneously.
GROSS: So let's move on to your big story, 'cause that - that's a huge story. So you broke a story about human trafficking where there are victims on both sides of the scam. The person making the ask, who's allegedly falling in love with you and then offers you the opportunity for this, like, great investment - they're basically enslaved. And so just, like, flesh out that scam a little bit before we talk about how it's done.
GREENBERG: Sure. So we were just talking a minute ago about, you know, these kinds of Nigerian scammers who are - you know, voluntarily, they are themselves carrying out this scam and profiting from it. But there's another much more profitable, more contemporary form of actually text-message-based scam known as pig-butchering. That is now the most profitable cybercrime in history that is stealing tens of billions of dollars a year from victims and, as you alluded to, is being run out of these scam compounds, mostly across Southeast Asia, where hundreds of thousands of another kind of victim are being enslaved and forced to carry out these scams.
GROSS: So what does pig-butchering mean?
GREENBERG: Well, pig-butchering is really the term used by the scammers. And it's this notion that the pig - the victim - is being fattened for slaughter. And they're fattened through a romance scam, one that sometimes develops over weeks or months or even more than a year, as the scammer builds trust with the victim. In fact, sometimes the victim becomes completely emotionally dependent on the scammer.
And only at the end of this very, very long con does the scammer, who has been impersonating, usually, a wealthy, single, attractive woman, you know, bring up this subject of, like, well, if you want our relationship to continue, it would be good if you were also wealthy. And I can introduce you, in fact, to an investment firm, an investment platform, where, just by sending, you know, a few thousand, few tens of thousands, a few hundred thousand dollars, you can become rich like me. This is a sure bet, and I can help you do it.
GROSS: OK. So how are people targeted who would have the money to do something like this?
GREENBERG: Well, in fact, all of us probably are targeted all the time. I mean, I get these text messages constantly that usually begin something like, you didn't wait for me at the restaurant, or, were you the one that I saw on the street today? Just completely...
GROSS: Oh.
GREENBERG: ...Random cold, you know, reach-outs.
GROSS: Oh. I get those, too, but I just automatically delete them.
GREENBERG: Well, if you were a lonely, sometimes elderly man, very often with a lot of retirement savings, you might not. And, you know, you might respond and say, I think you have the wrong person. They find an excuse to begin the conversation. They send a photo of themselves. It's a beautiful woman. They're very, very interested in you personally. And before you know it, you've struck up a friendship and then a kind of romance, flirtation, that blossoms into, you know, something just unbelievably rewarding - this love affair with a rich person who seems like they're just changing your whole life.
And these are not, like, very often targeted scams. They're very, very widely cast nets. And sometimes the - you know, the people that they ensnare are not wealthy, and the scam is only for a few thousand dollars. But sometimes they succeed at finding someone who does have a kind of nest egg that they're eventually tricked into sending over entirely into what they think is this trading platform.
Usually, they're tricked into converting it into a cryptocurrency, very often this stablecoin - this, like, cryptocurrency called Tether that does not change in value but can be sent across borders very easily. They think that they're watching their money double and triple on this investment platform, and then eventually they try to take their money out. Sometimes the scammer says, well, to take your money out, you have to send in $10,000 more or $100,000 more. And only after they've sent everything they have, do they realize that it was all a lie and that their life is ruined - that this relationship was an illusion and that they're not just broke but in debt.
GROSS: Well, we need to take a short break here, so let me reintroduce you. If you're just joining us, my guest is Andy Greenberg. He's a senior writer for Wired magazine, and we're talking about his investigation into a cybercrime group in Laos behind lucrative romance scams. We'll be right back. This is FRESH AIR.
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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. Let's get back to my interview with Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for Wired magazine. When we left off, he was talking about romance scams - for example, when someone reaches out to you via a text or online, gains your affection and trust and lures you into what they say is a great investment opportunity that turns out to be a scam to get your money.
So the people who are communicating with the victims are victims themselves. Tell us the story of how the person who leaked all this information to you became a victim and was forced to target people and ask them to invest.
GREENBERG: Well, there's been a lot of focus on, yes, the victims of these scams. But last summer, I got an email from the encrypted email service Proton Mail. No subject line, but it said, I am a computer engineer. I am trapped in a scam compound in the Golden Triangle region of Laos. I am unable to get out of here, and I'm still forced to work here. But I want to leak to you, Andy, everything I can to expose this place and the crime that is being committed here.
And so, you know, I respond to this. I, of course, wasn't sure if this was real or a scam itself. But I switched over, with this source, to the encrypted messaging app Signal with disappearing messages for his safety and began this conversation that would go on for months. In fact, you know, I'm still in touch with this person. And he would eventually not only leak all of these secrets to me, as promised.
And by the way, he asked me to call him - in this first conversation, he asked me to call him Red Bull. He told me his story of how he was a computer engineer who had gotten a diploma from a university in India. He had been offered a job as an IT manager, he thought, in Southeast Asia. But he was told he had to fly to Thailand and then cross the border into the Golden Triangle region of Laos, this kind of special economic zone that is largely controlled by Chinese business interests and, I would later learn, you know, largely controlled by Chinese criminal organizations, it turns out.
GROSS: So once he got to the compound where he was basically enslaved, they not only confiscated his passport. They told him, the only way you can get it back is to buy it back, and, you know, you will be paid for doing this work. What was the problem with that logic?
GREENBERG: It's interesting because some of these human-trafficking-driven scam compounds are actually, you know, prisons where people are shackled and beaten. But this, as you're getting at, was more of a debt-bondage situation. He was told that he owed thousands of dollars to his captors - that, you know, the cost of getting him there, that his room and board meant that he was in debt to them. And he could only pay that back by scamming victims and earning a commission, which he could eventually use to pay off his contract, in quotes, because all of this was an illusion.
There was this very deceptive kind of model where the bosses of this compound would tell them that - you can get rich here. You can go home with money to, you know, the village that you came from. But only if you're motivated enough to carry out really big scams, and you'll be paid a tiny percentage of that and get, you know, wealthy yourself.
But in the meantime, he and all of his coworkers who were enslaved in this building were actually just fined constantly for not meeting their quotas of outreach, for not maintaining their fake profiles online sufficiently, for not arriving to work exactly on time - just truly tragic modern slavery situations, but dressed up as a kind of corporate sales floor where, you know, their bosses sent them these inspirational messages every day saying, reach out to that next customer like you're going to change their life. Act like you have something of value, because you do. We're on a mission here to change lives. Strange, Orwellian kind of rhetoric like this when, in fact, they were all trapped there, doing this against their will, and carrying out something that was incredibly damaging and criminal.
GROSS: How is AI used in writing the scenarios and coming up with dialogue and creating, like, fraudulent personas?
GREENBERG: Well, Red Bull told me that he used ChatGPT and the Chinese AI chatbot DeepSeek, and that everyone in the compound was trained to do this. And this was just kind of a basic way that they would come up with new topics of conversation and polish their language - sort of never run out of these inviting turns of phrase and even, you know, bits of, like, inspirational, you know, poetry and things and kind of, like, just the perfect phrase to say goodnight to someone in a way that would, you know, resonate and leave them with this good feeling.
And so these AI chatbots were just kind of their constant companion and very helpful for them in terms of their language. But just as importantly was that they would use video deepfakes as well. This was rare. You know, they would - they were told by their bosses to try to talk the victim out of doing a video call.
Of course, the person on the other end is always trying to do a video call to see the person that they're in love with. But they were told, like, come up with excuses. Say you don't - you know, you can't do it during your workday. You're too tired. You're whatever - something to just delay until, once in a while, they could make use of a model who basically worked throughout the day in this one room of the compound and was their video deepfake model. They would then have a video chat with this model, but use deepfake software to alter their appearance to match whatever photo they had initially sent to the victim so that it truly looks to the victim like they're speaking to exactly the person they've seen a photo of, and the illusion is complete.
Now, you know, video deepfake software is - can be very sophisticated. Like, particularly this one piece of Chinese software called Haotian that I have seen demonstrations of. But it's not perfect. And I think that what matters here is that the victim, by the time that the video call happened, just wanted to believe that it was real. And so they overlook the flaws. They see them. They - maybe just a glitch in the internet or something. And they take the bait.
GROSS: So scams like this cast a really wide net. And the bigger the net, the more the likelihood that someone'll bite, right? So I assume that the text phone numbers are generated the same way that all of those robo calls are that we get every single day.
GREENBERG: That's right. You know, we all get these text messages. But very often the scammers in these compounds - Red Bull too - was trained to look through Facebook profiles and send Facebook Messenger messages to people who looked like they would be vulnerable as well - to older men, for instance, to wealthy men.
And so this was not entirely just a randomized, you know, spray-and-pray approach to scamming, although, you know, we see that happening all the time too. There was also sometimes a certain amount of targeting. And the bosses would say things to Red Bull and his forced-labor co-workers like, you know, don't just focus on the big cities in the U.S., like Chicago and New York. There are wealthy people - you may not understand this, but there are wealthy people in places like - you know, in the South and in the Midwest. So make sure to target them as well. So, no, it's not entirely random. Sometimes it is targeted to a certain degree, but it's still done at a mass scale. And most of what Red Bull did all day, every day was just these kinds of attempts at reach-out.
GROSS: So what do you expect AI might contribute to future scams?
GREENBERG: Well, for now, AI is this kind of tool that helps human scammers. But I think the next step, and we're already starting to see this, is fully autonomous AI scamming. And, in fact, just last week, Anthropic - the AI company - revealed this case study in a report where 20 dating apps were created by some Chinese organization that were fully populated with AIs that were just carrying out, essentially, romance scams where the victim just had to keep paying to continue the conversation.
And on this dating app, most of the people, in quotes, that the victims were talking to were actually fully autonomous AI. And they were entirely deceived and paying into this app to continue the conversation with someone who they thought was real and interested in them, but was actually just a large language model. That does seem to be the future.
And I've also recently covered a study that actually showed that for much of the scam process, AI is actually better than a human being - more responsive, more engaged and attentive than a human being - at creating this relationship, which is the vast majority of what these scams are trying to do before they enter this end game where they ask for a payment.
GROSS: My guest is Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for Wired magazine. We're talking about his investigation into a cybercrime group in Laos behind lucrative romance scams. We'll be right back. I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.
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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross. Let's get back to my interview with Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for Wired magazine. He covers hacking, cybersecurity and surveillance. We're talking about cyber scams.
When we left off, he was telling us that one of the most lucrative scams, the romance scam, is often carried out by people who are being held against their will by crime organizations in Southeast Asia. Greenberg was contacted by a young computer engineer using the pseudonym Red Bull, who was tricked into moving from India to Laos with the promise of a good IT job. When he got there, his passport was confiscated. He was told the only way to get free was to earn commissions from the money he scammed from victims.
So what would you estimate is the percentage of people who actually fall for the scam and give away thousands, tens of thousands or their life savings of money?
GREENBERG: This entire group of around, I believe, 30 scammers only earned about $2.2 million over the three-month period that Red Bull recorded and leaked to us. So this is a numbers game, though. So, you know, this is one small group within one compound. And there are dozens of these compounds just, you know, in Laos, then many, many more in Cambodia and Myanmar. So you can see how, you know, this adds up to tens of billions of dollars a year.
GROSS: So your source was discovered, not for talking to you, but for trying to escape. So would you describe the punishment he was subjected to?
GREENBERG: So after about a month of Red Bull leaking materials to me, we at Wired said, you know, this is very risky. In fact, it felt like security was increasing in the compound. Red Bull told me that he had seen new surveillance cameras installed, like, in his office, one of which was above his desk. So we at Wired said, we need to call this quits. Our reporting has ended for now. And we'll talk when you get out of the compound. And we won't run the story, of course, until then either. So Red Bull, at that point, surprised me by saying, well, I need to leave now, then - I can't live here.
He was a very ineffective scammer, among other things. So he was completely broke and subsisting only on the food given to them in the compound cafeteria, which was basically just rice and these vegetables that he said tasted of strange chemicals. And he felt like he was sick all the time and hated what he was doing and told me that he was going to try to escape. And the way that he tried to do that was by forging a document from the Indian police from his hometown, a fake Indian police letter saying that he was under investigation. And he wanted to show this to his bosses and say, I need to go home to deal with this or you'll get in trouble, too. I'll come back as soon as I've convinced the police that everything is OK.
I tried to talk him out of this. But he went forward with this plan. And the forgery was detected immediately. And his bosses put him in a room and beat him and kicked him and starved him, and interrogated him, and at one point, even drugged him, gave him this white powder in a cup of water and told him to drink it. And I think it must've been a stimulant of some kind. It made him feel more talkative, but actually made his skin break out in hives. I think they wanted to get the truth out of him of what his real intentions were. When, in fact, all he wanted to do was go home. They did not ever learn that he was speaking to me, and if they had, I'm quite sure that he would've been killed.
GROSS: How did he finally get out?
GREENBERG: It happened that during this period when Red Bull was being treated almost like a stray dog in this compound, just horribly abused, he learned that the compound had to relocate, that the bosses, it seemed, had gotten a tip about an impending police raid by the Laotian Golden Triangle police. It would turn out that this was kind of a performative raid that didn't actually shut anything down. But the bosses didn't seem to know that. So they did have to move.
Initially, they moved the office into their dormitory. And everyone had to just try to work out of the very overcrowded dorms. And so this actually allowed Red Bull - amazingly, he took this opportunity to get even more secrets from his work phone, sending them to his personal phone. And he also saw an opportunity to say to his bosses, you know, I'm clearly just dead weight to you during this time when you're already having a lot of trouble carrying out your work. Just let me go. And I'll just get out of your hair, if you can just release me. And surprisingly, to me, anyway, they agreed. And they essentially kicked him out.
GROSS: So in the initial contact with you, he used a pseudonym, Red Bull. But he eventually revealed his real name, which is?
GREENBERG: Mohammad Muzahir. And, in fact, I visited Mohammad in India after his return from the compound, before we published our article, and interviewed him there and talked with him at length about whether he wanted to reveal this name publicly. And he very clearly decided that he did, that he wanted to show his face. He actually appeared in a video we made as well.
And that's because he wants to inspire people to fight these criminal organizations, to stand up for themselves as he did. And he wants to do that with his own name and face. That was his choice. It, of course, came with risks that haunt me even now. But, you know, it was, I think, a very brave thing to do. And he is, in fact, a remarkable person, one of the most incredible sources I've ever had the opportunity to work with.
GROSS: Well, let me reintroduce you. If you're just joining us, my guest is Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for Wired magazine. The article that he wrote about the scam we've been discussing is titled "He Leaked The Secrets Of A Southeast Asia Scam Compound. Then He Had To Get Out Alive." We'll be right back after a short break. This is FRESH AIR.
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GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. Let's get back to my interview with Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for Wired magazine. He covers hacking, cybersecurity and surveillance.
So I want to talk with you about cybersecurity and the ability of countries to hack into our infrastructure. When the U.S. started bombing Iran and it was clear we're at war, one of my first thoughts was, there goes our water, there goes our electric grid, because we know those are hackable. We know that Iran has already done some hacking. We know that their allies, like North Korea, Russia, they have the capacity to hack us. And you wrote an incredible story about a cyber war game involving China. So let me just ask you first, like, what do you think Iran's capabilities of hacking our infrastructure are right now, and have they already made inroads into that?
GREENBERG: So in May of this year, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the kind of federal cyberdefense agency, warned that Iranian hackers in the midst of this war begun by the U.S. were retaliating by targeting American critical infrastructure and specifically these industrial control systems, which is a kind of technology that bridges the gap between kind of, like, digital computers and physical equipment, including in places like power grids and manufacturing and water utilities as well.
And then in August, we began to see that a handful of water utilities in Minnesota were being attacked, and it wasn't clear who was behind it. But then the attacks began to spread, eventually to 11 other states. The New York Times was the first to report that, yes, indeed, like, it was Iranian hackers who officials suspected were carrying this out. We at Wired obtained a water utility industry memo that linked those attacks to the earlier warning from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency confirming that, yes, this was Iran carrying out this unprecedented wave of cyberattacks against American water utilities.
I mean, we've never seen anything quite like this, and it has now hit more than a hundred U.S. water utilities. In fact, the Center for Strategic and International Studies did an analysis of all of these cyberattacks on U.S. water and found that only one utility in Georgia had really been affected to what it described as a medium degree. And that meant that it had lost water pressure, and it had to tell its customers that they needed to boil their water because there was a risk of contamination. In other cases, most of these utilities actually just lost the ability to send commands to their equipment. They lost control temporarily. They were shut out. There was an outage. They recovered from it without any real risk to human beings.
GROSS: So in August, you wrote a very alarming story about how China has already positioned itself inside American infrastructure. What do we know about what China has already done?
GREENBERG: Well, to back up a bit - so in 2023, Microsoft and, you know, a group of U.S. federal agencies, including the National Security Agency, revealed that this Chinese hacker group called Volt Typhoon had broken into electric grid and telecommunications computer networks, mostly around military facilities in the continental U.S. and Guam. Now, this was very alarming because it seems like, according to these government agencies and Microsoft, these Chinese hackers were prepositioning, as they put it, planting malicious code, malware that they could use at a time of their choosing to disrupt the electricity to military bases.
And, you know, the theory that developed was that perhaps they were preparing for something like the Chinese invasion of Taiwan and wanted to be able to delay or disrupt a U.S. response to that invasion. And, in fact, over the next year, it started to become clear that Volt Typhoon, this group of Chinese hackers, had actually broken into tons of civilian infrastructure as well. I spoke to the chief security officer of a utility in Littleton, Massachusetts, this town of, like, 10,000 people, and he had no idea why these Chinese military hackers would want to gain the ability to disrupt electric and water flow to his town.
But the theory within the cybersecurity community has now adapted to become that China is trying to gain the ability to distract and disrupt not just the U.S. military, but U.S. society as a whole, that this could be a kind of preparation for a kind of catastrophic hacking of civilian infrastructure in the U.S. that would cause societal chaos, as many government officials and cybersecurity experts have described it to me.
GROSS: So the people invited to participate in this war game were leaders of insurance companies, which struck you as a kind of strange group to be invited and also made you think that this might be pretty boring, which it was not. But there was also a good reason for inviting insurance companies, which I'd like you to briefly explain.
GREENBERG: Well, it turns out very often the victim of a cyberattack, their first call is to their insurance company, which then is, you know, through that cyber insurance that they pay for, that unlocks the money that they then use to hire defenders and lawyers and incident responders. And so, actually, cyber insurance firms are incredibly important in the response to these kinds of attacks.
GROSS: So the war game raised the question of who do you tell? Like, if you're an insurance company and you have found out that 5,000, you know, water systems have been shut down, who do you tell? And how does that reflect your values?
GREENBERG: Well, I would say the real crux of this whole game was when the roleplayers, these insurance executives, were asked, where are you going to send your money first? Who do you prioritize? Like, do you want to first remediate, you know, hospital towns to try to save human lives? Do you focus on your biggest customers because you have contracts with them and you're just legally obliged, and through your business model, obliged to help them first. In this game, actually, military officials were telling the insurance executives, you actually have to help military bases first for our national security interests.
To the credit of everyone in the room, all of these executives did say, at least initially, that they would focus on saving human lives. But then one guy, one executive, did raise his hand and kind of say, I don't know if that's realistic. Like, we do have legal obligations to our customers, and I don't know if we can ignore the demands of the government and the military as they talk about our national strategic interest. That meant perhaps sacrificing lives - American lives to fulfill those other priorities. So it was a very sobering moment in this room.
GROSS: It seems to me, and to so many people, that we're at a very frightening point in the development of AI and in hacking where we're feeling increasingly vulnerable as individuals and as a country. What are you feeling now?
GREENBERG: I think that, you know, having covered the cyber war in Ukraine, having written a book about catastrophic cyberattacks carried out by a Russian hacker group called Sandworm, I've just (laughter) learned to live with this fear of cyberwar among the many other catastrophes looming over American society. And it was only in a war game like the one that I attended with these insurance executives that it suddenly becomes real. And it is absolutely chilling to imagine the cascading effects of this and the ways that it would have very real victims, and that it's something that we are simply not prepared for.
GROSS: Andy Greenberg, thank you so much.
GREENBERG: Thank you, Terry. I appreciate the conversation.
GROSS: Andy Greenberg is a senior writer for Wired magazine and author of the forthcoming book "The Grayscale: True Stories Of Hackers, Outlaws And Vigilantes From The Online Underground." After we take a short break, Kevin Whitehead, our jazz historian, celebrates the centennial of John Coltrane's birth. This is FRESH AIR.
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