ELISSA NADWORNY, HOST:
And now a look at what's driving Iran and U.S. foreign policy as their decisions create upheaval to the global economy. Suzanne Maloney directs the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution, and she's on the line with us now. Good morning.
SUZANNE MALONEY: Good morning, Elissa.
NADWORNY: So let's start with the strait. What do you make of the back-and-forth between Iran and the U.S. about blocking it?
MALONEY: Well, I think that that was a sign that there was at least some initial optimism that we might be moving towards some kind of a solution, the fact that the Iranian foreign minister on Friday tweeted that the strait would be open. But the president's own social media post indicating that the U.S. would maintain the blockade very clearly persuaded the Iranians that they were not - it was not time yet to begin relinquishing their most important leverage in this negotiation.
NADWORNY: Yeah, let's talk a little bit about that optimism heading into the weekend. So President Trump was kind of - he said on Friday he was expecting a deal in a day or two. I mean, is there any indication what progress has been made and on what issues?
MALONEY: I think we're still fairly far from a very detailed agreement that would ensure the kind of confidence that would enable shippers to begin resume transit through the Strait of Hormuz. But I do think that there are at least some general agreements on the table. It's going to take a very long time, I think, to get to a deal that could be sustainable, that could be durable. And I'm not sure the president has the patience for that. That's one of the challenges that we have before us. He has continuously used social media threats as a means of trying to press the Iranians to give up more. The Iranians believe that time is on their side.
NADWORNY: So Iran's lead negotiator said the ceasefire that ends in a few days is a victory for his country. What's the logic there?
MALONEY: Well, I think the Iranians believe that they've been able to withstand the pummeling by two technologically and militarily superior adversaries. They believe that they have the endurance as a result of the way that they have handled their own munitions and drones and missiles. They still have a considerable stockpile while the United States and its partners are facing declining supplies of interceptors that would prevent the damage from Iranian onslaught. So, you know, they're prepared to hold out. The blockade certainly will hurt them, but they can probably withstand a longer period of disruption than the global economy has because, of course, the closure of the strait began in early March, and the blockade on Iran's own access to shipping only began last week.
NADWORNY: Yeah, so time is actually on their side. President Trump has talked about Iran's nuclear program, regime change, the Strait of Hormuz, even Iran's oil as major issues in prosecuting the war. Where do you think Iran ranks those? And how do they compare with what the U.S. wants?
MALONEY: I think there is a disconnect between what the U.S. wants and may need and what the Iranians are prepared to demand. The Iranians will want to maintain some kind of control over the Strait of Hormuz. What that looks like and what the terms are are up for negotiations. But they're not going to go back to status quo ante. They seem to be prepared to provide some level of compromise on enrichment of uranium, which is a key element of their nuclear program, but they're not prepared to give what the United States wants, which is either an indefinite or a very long-term suspension of that enrichment. There's also some questions about the status of some highly enriched uranium within the country. That, too, seems to be an area where there may be room for compromise, but we're still very far apart on what the terms might be.
And so, you know, we know that the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that involves negotiations by six world powers took several years to negotiate. It was 159 dense pages of text. It's going to be very hard, I think, to get to anything like that in a matter of days, but it might be possible if, in fact, there's some goodwill on both sides to get to at least a framework that begins to mitigate some of the damage that the global economy has been facing as a result of the closure of the strait.
NADWORNY: Suzanne, what are you looking for next? I mean, where does this go?
MALONEY: Well, I think we'll wait to see who comes to Islamabad and what those negotiations look like. They appeared in the first round to try to go for broke. They negotiated for 21 hours straight. That was probably not a realistic way to get to any kind of meaningful agreement, but they did make some progress. And we'll have to see if they can create a longer and deeper platform for some kind of negotiations that perhaps begins with a framework agreement that has mutual understandings on both sides and then leaves time and space for negotiators to hammer out some of the very thorny technical details.
NADWORNY: If we end up back with the Obama negotiation, is that a win?
MALONEY: No, I don't think that there is any way to spin the outcome of this war in a way that would suggest that we've actually strategically gained. This has been a loss, both in terms of our relationships with partners and allies, as the previous segment underscored, but also in terms of Iran's position in the region. It now very much sees itself as stronger. It's been able to harass and injure many of its neighbors and their economies. And the regime itself has stood. So even if we do get some concessions on the nuclear program, it's hard to imagine that that is a better outcome than what we - than where we were before the war or certainly before 2018 when the president in his first term walked away from the nuclear deal.
NADWORNY: That's Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution. Thank you so much for speaking with us today.
MALONEY: Thank you.
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